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BEDLAM IN BEIRUT: 
A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE IN 1826 
THEOPHILUS C. PROUSIS 1 
Foreign consuls from European states compiled countless 
communiques about the state of the Ottoman Empire during the 
turbulent early nineteenth century, a period fraught with internal and 
external crises triggered by war, revolt, sectarian tension, the 
breakdown of once effective governing institutions, and European 
rivalries associated with the Eastern Question. Consular records offer 
firsthand information and a treasure trove of detail on economic, 
commercial, social, political, and military conditions in the Ottoman 
world. By relating specific incidents, episodes, and situations, 
eyewitness commentaries by consuls provide insight into urban and 
rural affairs and shed light on the human dimension of everyday life in 
Ottoman society during a time of chronic disorder and unrest. These 
advantages largely explain why scholars have tapped consular writings 
as a valuable resource for studying such topics as the Smyrna rebellion 
of 1797 and Ottoman reprisals against Greek Orthodox Christian 
subjects in Smyrna and Thessaloniki after the outbreak of the Greek 
War of Independence in 1821.2 The unpublished document presented 
here, composed in 1826 by British consul John Barker in Aleppo, 
describes a failed Greek naval assault on Beirut and the harsh response 
by regional authorities against local Christians in this multi-
confessional Levantine port. Barker's account merits attention and 
I Department of History, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida. 
"For a British consul's view of an urban riot in Smyrna, provoked by a lack of discipline 
in the janissary corps, see Clogg 1983 and 1976: 15-17. For consular descriptions of the 
turmoil and disorder in Smyrna and Thessaloniki in 1821-22, see Clogg 1972, Prousis, 
1991, a translation and analysis of the unpublished diary of Russian consul-general 
Spyridon Destunis, and Lascaris 1943. 
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commentary by historians of the Greek revolt and Ottoman society and 
exemplifies the usefulness of consular reports, widely dispersed in the 
archives of Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey, for examining specific 
aspects of the Ottoman Levant. 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon formed part of Ottoman Syria, an 
expansive administrative region encompassing the contemporary lands 
of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the West Bank and divided into 
pashaliks (provinces) which included the key towns of Aleppo, 
Damascus, Acre, Tripoli, and Sidon. With the collapse of effective 
centralized rule, regional governors such as Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha 
(1775-1804), Sulayman Pasha (1804-19), and Abdallah Pasha (1819-
31) exerted sweeping power in their territories, relying on tax agents to 
collect tribute dues from urban and rural populations and on armed 
retinues comprised of regular and irregular forces to crush opposition 
and to maintain control. In Lebanon, Emir Bashir II enjoyed a long and 
successful stint (1788-1840) as chief tribute collector and local leader, 
preserving his command by supporting the nominal authority of the 
sultan and, more importantly, working closely with the principal 
powerbrokers in the Levant, above all Abdallah Pasha of Damascus and 
Acre. Bashir curbed threats from Lebanon's tribal chieftains, sheikhs, 
and notables who coveted his position, and the emir crushed a tax 
revolt in several districts that opposed the heavy tribute payments 
imposed by Abdallah Pasha. 3 Bashir also collaborated with the upstart 
governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, the rebellious Albanian officer who 
transformed Egypt into a virtually independent entity and founded a 
dynasty that reigned well into the twentieth century. When Sultan 
Mahmud II called on Muhammad Ali's army and navy to subdue Greek 
rebels on Crete and in the Morea, Bashir pledged to supply Egypt's 
modernizing governor with 10,000 troops to assist in the anti-insurgent 
expedition (Salibi 1965:26). 
It was during the tumultuous emirate of Bashir II that the 
relatively small and insignificant town of Beirut began to experience a 
growth spurt as a commercial center. Inhabited by nearly 8,000 
residents in the mid-1820s, Beirut blossomed into a bustling 
3 For an introduction to Ottoman rule in Syria in the early nineteenth century, 
including Lebanon during the emirate of Bashir II, see Fawaz 1983 and 1994, Harik 
1968, Issawi, 1988, with an extensive bibliography, Polk 1963:1-82, Salibi 1965:xiv-
xxvii, 3-39, Hitti 1967:317-432, and the essays by Khalaf 1982 and by Chevallier 1982. 
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international emporium with a population of around 120,000 by 1900 
(Fawaz 1983:1,30,127). Bashir promoted and financed roads, bridges, 
and other public works projects, all of which contributed to the 
production and marketing of silk, Lebanon's major export to the West 
(Fawaz 1983:39-43,63). Beirut's commercial potential largely explains 
why European consulates established themselves on a permanent basis 
in the 1820s and 1830s. Consuls interceded for their countries' 
merchants, expedited business transactions, provided notary services, 
and compiled summaries on the prospects and results oflocal trade.4 
Consulates went hand in hand with capitulations - commercial 
and legal privileges granted by the Ottoman government to consuls, 
traders, and travelers from European states which had signed treaty 
agreements with the Sublime Porte. These concessions included 
reduced customs duties, immunity from Ottoman laws and taxes, 
diplomatic protection, and guarantees of personal security.5 While not 
always observed by sultans, or automatically binding on regional and 
port authorities, capitulations were manipulated by European states in 
pursuit of strategic and economic gain in the Ottoman Empire. For 
instance, by distributing berats (patents or licenses of protection) to 
Ottoman subjects, European envoys and consuls extended capitulatory 
privilege to Greeks, Arab Christians, Jews, Armenians, and others 
whose skills and services helped to advance European interests. By the 
early nineteenth century, Ottoman beneficiaries of the capitulations -
known as proteges or beratlis (holders or owners of herats) - numbered 
in the thousands throughout the Ottoman realm, including scores of 
Maronite and Eastern Orthodox Christians in Beirut (Fawaz 1983: 23-
4 Frangakis-Syrett (1992) makes excellent use of British, French, Dutch, and other 
European consular papers in her analysis of commercial activity in the Ottoman 
Levant. Kremmydas (1972) draws on French consular records in his study of commerce 
in the Peloponnese. For a Russian perspective, introducing Russian consular resources 
on trade and shipping in the Ottoman Empire, see Prousis 2000-2001, 2003, and 2004. 
Arsh (1970:27-76) relies on Russian consular dispatches in his depiction of social, 
economic, and political circumstances in the Ottoman world in the early nineteenth 
century. On the various functions and duties of consuls in the Levant, see Platt 
1971:124-79. 
5 On the capitulations and their repercussions in the Ottoman Empire, see van den 
Boogert 2005; van den Boogert and Fleet 2003, a collection of essays which originally 
appeared in Oriente Moderno, 2003, 12/83, no. 3, pp. 575-714; Hamilton, de Groot and 
van den Boogert 2000; Ahmad 2000; Goffman 1986 and 1990; Inalcik 1971; Susa 
1933:1-173; Inalcik and Quataert 1994:188-95,480-83,517-26,724-42,837-42; Rey 1899. 
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24; and 1994:73-75, 85-88).6 Exempt from Ottoman taxation and 
justice, proteges served as interpreters, business agents, suppliers, ship 
captains, and middlemen for European merchants anxious to expand 
their operations and to increase their countries' economic influence in 
the Levant. 7 Capitulatory status also gave proteges a competitive edge 
over non-protege Ottoman subjects in trade and business ventures. 
The Smyrna-born John Barker (1771-1849), as British consul in 
Aleppo from 1799 to 1825 and then in Alexandria from 1826 to 1833, 
witnessed many of the significant events and developments that shaped 
the Ottoman Levant during the early nineteenth century. His long-time 
consular service gave him the opportunity to record his observations, 
impressions, and experiences in myriad letters, notes, and papers on 
Syria, Egypt, and adjacent areas. Edited and published by his son, who 
summarized and excerpted his father's writings, John Barker's 
correspondence and communiques covered a wide range of topics-
topography, climate, commerce, agriculture, silk production, consular 
functions, capitulations and proteges, great power intrigues, and 
relationships between the region's different religious and ethnic groups. 
Along with firsthand vignettes of notable figures, such as Muhammad 
Ali of Egypt, Barker detailed some of the salient problems in the 
administrative and governmental affairs of Syria, including the 
extortion, arbitrary rule, and other abuses associated with Abdallah 
Pasha (Grant and Milne 2004, Barker 1876). 
In the dispatch of April 1826 featured below, addressed to 
Stratford Canning, British ambassador in Constantinople, Barker 
recounted an event that had occurred the previous month. A Greek 
naval attack on Beirut had been thwarted by hastily arranged defense 
forces, the invaders had tried but failed to incite Christians and Druzes 
to join their cause, and regional governor Abdallah Pasha had exacted 
revenge.8 Barker had already received word of his new appointment as 
consul in Alexandria, but unrest at sea caused by the ongoing conflict 
between Greek rebels and Ottoman-Egyptian forces, not to mention 
"For more on beratlis, also see Mazower 2005:119-21. 
7 On the role of proteges in European trade networks in the Ottoman Empire, especially 
their prominence in Russia's burgeoning trade in the Black Sea and the eastern 
Mediterranean, see Arsh 1970:129-66; Prousis 2002:1-14; Kardasis 2001; Harlaftis 
1990. 
8 Barker's report to Canning can be found in The National Archives, Kew (hereafter 
TNA), FO 352/12A, ff. 413-14a. 
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fear of piracy, kept Barker and his family ensconced in Aleppo for the 
time being. Barker thus did not witness the incident in Beirut, nor its 
tragic consequences, but he gleaned information from letters sent to the 
French, Austrian, and Spanish consuls in Aleppo from their agents and 
vice-consuls in Beirut. Barker's subsequent notes to Canning discussed 
the ongoing warfare "in Greece and throughout the Archipelago" and 
the disorders in Syria triggered by the despotic rule of Abdallah Pasha 
of Acre.9 Ambassador Canning (1786-1880), whose career diplomatic 
service featured several stints as British envoy to the Sublime Porte 
(1810-12, 1825-29, 1841-57), relied on a steady flow of messages from 
Barker and other British agents and representatives in the Ottoman 
Empire to craft his own communications with the British Foreign 
Office and the Ottoman government on the Greek issue. Canning 
worked closely with his French and Russian counterparts to mediate 
the conflict between insurgent Greece and the sultan's regime, to 
prevent the fighting from escalating into a wider Near Eastern war, and 
to guarantee autonomy for the Morea and some of the nearby Greek 
islands (Chamberlain 2004).10 
According to the information Barker gathered from his European 
sources, on 18 March 1826 a flotilla of around fifteen Greek ships 
anchored at the harbor of Beirut and landed about 500 troops.ll 
Assailants scaled part of the defense walls, while "ships cannonaded the 
town." Caught off guard, "in the absence of all regular military force" 
and with "a very scanty supply of firearms and ammunition," the fort 
that was supposed to secure the town from sea invasion "was as ill 
provided as the inhabitants." Resistance surfaced, however, thanks to a 
local mufti (judge or interpreter of Muslim law), who "distinguished 
himself in instructing and animating the townspeople" to defend 
Beirut. The fighting resulted in casualties: "the loss sustained by the 
besiegers was in all 40 or SO [persons]," while the besieged suffered "14 
killed and 20 wounded." The town incurred damage "from 500 
[cannon] balls, of which 2 struck the French consular house and 3 that 
of the Austrian agent." Although rebuffed, Greek invaders did not 
immediately depart but took refuge near the seashore, occupying "a 
9TNA, Fa 352/12A, ff. 423-24a, 447-59. 
to On British policy toward the Greek War of Independence, see Cunningham 1993a, 
Crawley 1930. 
II The summary and quoted passages come from the featured document. 
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number of detached houses in the silk grounds, but that being chiefly 
inhabited by Christians," the Greeks "did not injure them." The 
attackers, according to one of Barker's sources, appealed to the 
Christians "to rise and join them." "It is also said they sent an 
invitation to the chief of the Druzes to unite his forces to the Christian 
standard; but however that may be, it is certain some thousand armed 
mountaineers were put in motion by Emir Beshir in aid of the Turks ... " 
A few days later, on 23 March 1826, after the departure of the 
Greek aggressors, a lieutenant of Abdallah Pasha arrived with nearly 
500 Albanian irregular forces and wreaked havoc among Beiruti 
Christians. "The inhabitants suffered more in their property from these 
undisciplined troops than the invasion of the Greeks had inflicted upon 
them, and the Christian part of the population, without distinction of 
Latin, Maronite, or Greek, was pursued and persecuted in a most 
merciless manner by the established authorities, while the Europeans 
themselves were not secure as well from the effects of the insolence and 
rapacity of the soldiery ... " A French merchant and an American 
missionary under British protection felt the direct impact of random 
violence when local troops forcibly entered their dwellings-"these 
gentlemen and their families were put in fear of their lives, maltreated, 
and robbed." Only with great difficulty did European consuls "repel" 
the "insolent attempts" of the attackers and "protect the rayahs in their 
service from sharing the fate of the other Christians, whose houses and 
silk plantations were confiscated, and all that could be seized were 
reduced to beggary after having been tortured for the purpose of 
extorting from them sums, which it was impossible for them to raise by 
the immediate sale of all their effects."12 
Barker's account of the Greek naval raid touches on several topics 
that bear importance for the study of the Ottoman Levant, such as the 
issue of Greek piracy in the eastern Mediterranean. For centuries 
Muslim corsairs from the Barbary Coast as well as Christian corsairs 
from Malta had attacked European and Ottoman shipping in the 
Mediterranean, but by the early nineteenth century Greek piracy had 
become the main threat to European and Ottoman merchant vessels in 
"The term reaya (sometimes cited as rayahs) originally designated all tax-paying 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman sultan, but from the eighteenth 
century the concept primarily described Ottoman Christians who paid taxes. European 
consuls and merchants recruited proteges, including domestic servants, from the reaya. 
See Faroqhi 1994, Shaw 1976:150-63, Sugar 1977:43-55. 
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the Levant. 13 Moreover, Greek corsairs as well as Albanian, Serb, and 
Bulgarian fighters often served as auxiliaries in tsarist Russia's military 
and naval campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. Some of these 
warriors fought in Russian operations in the Aegean and the Levant, 
including Russia's naval siege and capture of Beirut during the Russo-
Turkish War of 1768-74.14 As successful privateers, Greek corsairs 
menaced yet also contributed to the Mediterranean maritime economy, 
especially since the lines between legal and illegal trafficking remained 
obscure at sea. For instance, respectable Greek traders often loaned 
money to finance privateering expeditions, and Greek merchants then 
purchased and resold the stolen goods delivered to them by pirates. 
Some privateers, when they raised enough money, participated in legal 
trade networks as skippers or part-owners of ships (Frangakis-Syrett 
1992:70-74,108-10). In these and other ways, seafaring Greeks became 
not just professional pirates but legitimate traders, shippers, and sailors 
for the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain, France, and other countries 
involved in Balkan and Levantine commerce. 
The Greek War of Independence exacerbated problems of piracy 
in Ottoman waters, as evinced in British consular records from several 
ports which experienced disruptions in British merchant shipping 
caused not just by corsairs but by insurgent naval sorties.1S Already in 
the early stages of the Greek struggle, naval actions against the Ottoman 
fleet threatened to degenerate into piracy, or so thought Francis Werry, 
Britain's consul in Smyrna. In May 1821 Werry wrote: "All the minor 
islands in the Archipelago have hoisted their new flag and swear to die 
or conquer under it. This is all very fine, but as they have no foreign 
power to assist them, no trade to support them, nor provisions to 
subsist for any length of time, I see this Grecian affair must end in 
piracy" (Clogg 1972:323). Indeed, as one scholar has asserted, the 
Aegean Archipelago "became almost impassable," as Greek privateers 
targeted Ottoman, European, and even American merchant vessels 
(Frangakis-Syrett 1992:72; Pitcairn Jones 1934). Werry's dispatches 
from the mid-1820s detailed the "nefarious traffic" and "depredations" 
"Earle 1970, Platt 1996, Panzac 2005, Mazower 2005:121-23; Harlaftis 2004:114-16, 
with numerous Greek-language sources on Greek piracy. 
14Pappas 1991:74. This entire work provides extensive coverage of Greek, Albanian, 
and other Balkan recruits and volunteers who served with Russian, French, and British 
forces. 
15TNA, FO 78/136, parts 1-3, ff. 1-3l3. 
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of Greek corsairs, while British traders petitioned the consul for 
protection from the "crying evil of Greek piracies" which preyed upon 
British-flagged cargo vessels in the Aegean.16 In May 1826, one month 
after his report of the Beirut foray, consul Barker in Aleppo anticipated 
danger on the sea voyage to his new consular posting in Alexandria, 
"exposing myself and family to the insults of the Greek corsairs and my 
household effects and property to the depredations of that band of 
freebooters, who daily commit the most daring acts of piracy, without 
the English or other flag being any security to those who may be so 
unfortunate as to fall into their power. .. m7 It should be pointed out, 
however, that the combined fleets of Hydra, Spetsae, Psara, Syros, 
Samos, and other islands played an important role in the Greek revolt. 
They controlled access to key ports and passages along Greece's 
coastline, severed Constantinople's sea communications with insurgent 
areas, and forced the Ottomans to mount a costly land invasion from 
Rumelia and Macedonia instead of a more direct maritime attack from 
the Aegean. IS 
The naval assault and Ottoman retribution depicted by Barker 
offer insight into the nature of the Greek-Ottoman conflict of the 1820s, 
a struggle that escalated into a war of revenge as both sides perpetrated 
excesses. The prominent Balkan historian Leften Stavrianos has argued 
that large-scale massacres against the defenseless represented "an 
inevitable accompaniment, perhaps, of a struggle that pitted, at one and 
the same time, Greek subjects against Turkish overlords, Greek 
peasants against Turkish landowners, and Greek Christians against 
Turkish Moslems" (Stavrianos 1958:284). This assessment remains 
generally accurate for the fighting in mainland Greece and on the 
Aegean islands, but additional factors help to explain the situation in 
Beirut. Abdallah Pasha sent a military detachment to punish the town's 
Christian communities, suspecting them of collaborating or at least 
sympathizing with Greek rebels. Envy, jealousy, and social-economic 
tension may also have fueled Ottoman reprisals. Maronite and Eastern 
Orthodox Christians included among their ranks proteges of European 
'IiTNA, FO 352/12A, ff. 32-36,43-49, 122-24; FO 352/12B, ff. 2-2a. 
17TNA, FO 352/12A, ff. 418-19. 
IS Greek naval actions during the Greek revolt receive attention in general histories of 
the Greek War of Independence: Dakin 1973, Woodhouse 1952, Clogg 1999:7-46. 
Works on the Greek merchant marine also cover naval events: Leon 1972, Kremmydas 
1985, Harlaftis 2004. 
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states, former Ottoman subjects who had become honorary European 
nationals exempt from Ottoman financial and legal jurisdiction and 
with a commercial advantage over non-protege Ottomans. Abdallah 
Pasha's abuses of power compelled some of the most prosperous and 
successful merchants in Beirut and Acre to seek shelter elsewhere in 
Lebanon (Fawaz 1983:25,46,105; Fawaz 1994:24,40-42). Beirut may 
have had the potential to develop into a flourishing commercial center, 
but the town and its inhabitants required public order and economic 
security before those prospects could be realized. 
To be sure, Abdallah Pasha's repression of Beirut's Christians 
pales in comparison to the massacres and outrages committed in 
Constantinople, Smyrna, and Thessaloniki in 1821-22, including the 
public execution of Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V in the Ottoman 
capital in April 1821 (Prousis 1991, Clogg 1972, Mazower 2005: 125-
30, Prousis 1994: 55-56). Random attacks against Greek Christian 
churches, shrines, shops, and persons, often in retaliation for Greek 
atrocities against Turks in the Morea and the Danubian Principalities, 
not only intensified hostilities between Greek and Turkish 
communities but transformed the Greek revolt into a religious war 
driven by the quest for sacred revenge. Ironically, the reprisals in Beirut 
served to erode the tolerance, coexistence, and interaction that 
characterized relationships between the town's diverse sectarian groups 
in the early nineteenth century. Maronites, Druzes, Orthodox 
Christians, Jews, Sunni Muslims, and others comprised a mosaic of 
pluralistic but segmented communities; they lived in relative peace and 
harmony, shared allegiance to an emir, yet managed their own 
community affairs and retained separate identities (Fawaz 1983:44-
48,103-06). 
The excesses in Beirut as well as in Smyrna and Thessaloniki 
exemplify the crisis of Ottoman imperial authority and the breakdown 
of law, order, and security in Ottoman urban centers during times of 
war and provocation. Indeed, Barker relates that Beirut's military 
defenses and coastal fortifications failed to prevent a naval attack in the 
harbor. The ensuing abuse and aggression evokes the alarm, anguish, 
and anxiety felt by all those residents who had to endure the arbitrary 
and oppressive rule of unruly pashas in the provinces. The specific case 
of Beirut in March 1826 provides a vivid reminder that the potential for 
social and political violence lurked just beneath the surface of Ottoman 
society, especially when the central government faced growing internal 
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and external pressures. Further, the episode clearly reveals the urgent 
need for governmental and administrative reform that would restore 
effective centralized rule, protect private property, maintain public 
security, and guarantee individual safety. Toward this end Sultan 
Mahmud II destroyed the anti-reform janissary corps in 1826 and 
launched a series of institutional and political reforms, but Ottoman 
Syria remained a dangerous place until the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, with chronic feuds between rival factions of local elites and 
bloody sectarian clashes (Khalaf 1982). 
Barker's note to Canning echoes conventional images and 
prevalent biases in European perceptions of the Ottoman Empire and 
Islam during the period of imperial decline and institutional collapse. 
European pens painted mostly negative pictures of "the oriental other," 
"the barbarous East," and "the sick man of Europe" in travel and 
consular writings, accentuating episodes of oppression, extortion, 
cruelty, and related abuses of power by regional potentates. 19 Barker's 
scenes of Adballah Pasha's reprisals against Beirut's Christians may 
have faithfully reflected "the effects of the insolence and rapacity of the 
soldiery" in this particular case, but his choice of words alludes to 
commonly accepted European perspectives on the state of the Ottoman 
Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
I have used the unpublished complete text of Barker's consular 
report, located in London's National Archives; a brief summary of this 
document appears in the two-volume collection of Barker writings 
edited and published by his son.20 I have rendered consul Barker's 
narrative into idiomatic language without altering the essential spirit or 
meaning of the document. Although in a few spots I have made slight 
changes in Barker's sentence structure, syntax, and punctuation for the 
sake of fluidity, I have generally remained faithful to the particulars of 
the consul's spelling, style, and perspective. My own emendations 
appear in brackets, and I have added an occasional explanatory note: 
19 For an introduction to the perceptions of European travelers and consuls in the 
Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Cunningham 1993b. 
Also useful on European attitudes toward Muslims in general and the Ottoman Turks 
in particular are Said 1979, Daniel 1966, Wheatcroft 1995. 
2<1 Edward Barker's summary and excerpts can be found in Barker 1876, vol. 2: 36-38. 
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"Aleppo the 9th April 1826 
To His Excellency [The] Right Honorable Stratford Canning, His 
Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary at the Sublime Porte 
Sir, 
On the 29th past [March] I had the honor to inform your 
Excellency that a Greek squadron, composed of 12 or 18 ships, had 
attempted to take Bairut. That troops, to the number of 1000, or 1500, 
had been landed; that they had penetrated into the heart of the city, had 
been compelled to retreat, and were, at the time of the reporters' 
quitting Bairut, in possession of some small towers and houses in the 
suburbs. 
The substance of this intelligence was fully confirmed last night 
by letters addressed by the foreign European agents at Bairut to their 
superiors here, the French, the Austrian, Spanish and Neapolitan 
consul-generals; and by a great number of private letters, dated the 30th 
and 31st March. The points, in which all accounts pretty nearly agree, 
are that on the evening of the 18th March, a Greek squadron of 11 ships 
(afterwards joined by 4 others) was perceived and recognized by the 
inhabitants of Bairut. No doubt being entertained of the meditated 
attack, in the absence of all regular military force, the citizens were 
immediately called to arms, and the night was passed in great disorder 
and preparations for the defense of the place. 
There was a very scanty supply of firearms and ammunition, and 
the fort, which defends the town from an invasion by sea, was as ill 
provided as the inhabitants. The mufti [judge or interpreter of Islamic 
law] is the chief person who is represented as having distinguished 
himself in instructing and animating the townspeople. 
At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 19th [March]' a body of 500 
men in a uniform resembling the Albanian costume21 was landed and 
was marched directly upon a part of the walls that the assailants had no 
difficulty in scaling. But they had scarcely got a footing within the 
21 "Albanian costume" refers to the dress often worn by Greek and Albanian Orthodox 
Christian bandits, rebels, and mountain warriors who resisted Ottoman authority: a 
kilted skirt with pistol and dagger tucked into a wide belt (Pappas 1991:26). Modern 
concepts of ethnicity and nationality did not really apply to these Balkan brigands who 
struggled against Ottoman rule. Loyalty to clan and region and a shared Eastern 
Orthodox faith trumped ethnic differences and brought Orthodox Albanians into much 
closer contact with Orthodox Greeks and Slavs than with Muslim Albanians. The 
majority of Albanians embraced Islam in the Ottoman era. 
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ramparts and taken possession of one house, when they were compelled 
to retreat, leaving the dead bodies of 3 or 4 of their companions on the 
spot. One of the vice-consuls' reports states that the number of Turks 
opposed to them at this point did not exceed 8 and consequently that 
the invaders were repulsed by that handful of volunteers. The ships 
cannonaded the town at the time it was attempted to be taken by 
assault, and the fort fired upon them occasionally. Some damage was 
suffered by the town from 500 balls, of which 2 struck the French 
consular house and 3 that of the Austrian agent. It was ascertained, 
through an Ionian captain, that one ball from the fort killed 13 men on 
board one of the ships and that the loss sustained by the besiegers was 
in all 40 or SO. That of the besieged is represented to be 14 killed and 
20 wounded. Upon their repulse, the Greeks did not immediately take 
to their boats, but established themselves in a little ruined tower near 
the seashore; and it appears [they] were masters of a number of 
detached houses in the silk grounds, but that being chiefly inhabited by 
Christians, they did not injure them. It is even stated in one account 
that they exhorted them to rise and join them. If so, they must have 
entertained a most erroneous idea of the number and power of the 
Christians in Bairut. It is also said they sent an invitation to the chief of 
the Druzes to unite his forces to the Christian standard; but however 
that may be, it is certain some thousand armed mountaineers were put 
in motion by the Emir Beshir in aid of the Turks, and that 
notwithstanding a report prevailed [that] His Excellency had severely 
bastinadoed the bearer of a letter to him from the Greeks, the proffered 
assistance was peremptorily refused, and not a Druze was permitted to 
enter the town. 
After the Greeks had taken up their position at the tower on the 
beach, the firing of the musketry continued, but it seems with very little 
effect on either side. Early on the 23rd [March] the Greeks embarked, 
and the whole squadron disappeared. In the afternoon of the same day 
the Kheya Bey [lieutenant] of Abdulla Pacha of Acri arrived with 500 
Arnouts,22 when the inhabitants suffered more in their property from 
these undisciplined troops than the invasion of the Greeks had inflicted 
" An officer of Abdallah Pasha of Acre arrived in Beirut with a detachment of Albanian 
Muslim irregular forces referred to as Arnouts or Arnaouts, derived from the Ottoman 
designation of them as arnavud or arnavutlar. These local auxiliaries formed part of the 
armed retinues hired and organized by Ottoman pashas to maintain regional power. 
Pappas (1991) includes many references to Albanian troops which served Ottoman 
authority and helped to subdue Greek and other Balkan rebellions. Also see Mazower 
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upon them, and the Christian part of the population, without 
distinction of Latin, Maronite, or Greek, was pursued and persecuted in 
a most merciless manner by the established authorities, while the 
Europeans themselves were not secure as well from the effects of the 
insolence and rapacity of the soldiery as from the arrogant prepotency 
of the governor. A party of Arnouts entered forcibly the dwelling 
houses of Monsieur Pourriere, a French merchant, and Mr. Goodell, an 
American missionary under British protection. These gentlemen and 
their families were put in fear of their lives, maltreated, and robbed. 
Their habitations were without the walls of the city. The officers of the 
government, in their eager pursuit of the helpless Christian natives, 
violated the French convent and some Frank houses/3 and it was with 
great difficulty the consuls themselves were enabled to repel their 
insolent attempts to carry their search into the interior of their own 
dwellings and protect the rayahs24 in their service from sharing the fate 
of the other Christians, whose houses and silk plantations were 
confiscated, and all that could be seized were reduced to beggary after 
having been tortured for the purpose of extorting from them sums, 
which it was impossible for them to raise by the immediate sale of all 
their effects. 
Monsieur Henri GuyS/5 the French consul at Bairut, positively 
states that three of those unhappy people were carried out of the 
presence of their inhuman tormentors in a dying state, and one had 
been tortured till he embraced the religion professed by his atrocious 
oppressors. 
I have the honor to be with the highest respect, Sir, your most 
obedient humble servant, 
John Barker" 
September 2006 
"The French convent belonged to the Capuchins, Franciscans, or Jesuits, Catholic 
missionary orders which had established themselves in Lebanon by the eighteenth 
century. "Frank houses" refers to dwellings owned and inhabited by "Franks," the 
term used by Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians of the Near East to describe the 
inhabitants of Western Europe, especially Roman Catholics. For most Greek Christians, 
"Franks" evoked the Latin Christian crusaders who sacked Constantinople during the 
Fourth Crusade in 1204. 
24 See note no.12 above on the term reaya. 
2sFawaz 1983:26. Guys (1787-1878) served as French consul in Beirut in 1808, 1810, and 
1824-38 and published several works based on his experiences, including 1850 and 1862. 
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